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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled on
November 19, 2009 that the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not allow a state
law to reverse preempt a foreign treaty or its implementing legislation. The
court decided that state laws regarding arbitration were superseded by the
treaty, a treaty that was not considered an Act of Congress as described by
the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Facts
The Louisiana Safety Association of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund,
colloquially referred to as "LSAT," is a workers' compensation self-
insurance fund.1 The LSAT provided insurance for members' occupational
injuries. 2 As some compensation claims exceeded the self-insurance that
LSAT provides, the LSAT contracted with Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's
for excess insurance coverage. 3 The LSAT reinsured claims included an
arbitration provision.4 LSAT additionally assigned its rights under the
reinsurance agreement with Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's with Safety
National through a loss portfolio transfer.5 Certain Underwriters contested
LSAT's assignment of rights to Safety National, claiming that the
reinsurance obligations were "strictly personal and therefore non-
assignable."6
I Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 587 F.3d 714,
717 (5th Cir. 2009) (rehearing en banc).
2 Id
4 Id
5 Id
6 Id. In its decision, however, the Fifth Circuit did not decide upon the issue of the
assigmnent of rights.
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B. Procedural History
Safety National sued Certain Underwriters in the District Court for the
Middle District of Louisiana, and Certain Underwriters moved to stay
proceedings and compel arbitration as per the contract between Certain
Underwriters and LSAT. 7 Once in arbitration, the parties could not agree on
the methodology of selecting an arbitrator. As such, Certain Underwriters
petitioned the district court to lift the stay, join LSAT as a party, and compel
arbitration regarding the composition of the arbitration panel.8 LSAT
responded that arbitration should be quashed because arbitration agreements
were unenforceable under Louisiana law. 9
The district court granted LSAT's motion to quash arbitration.' 0 The
district court concluded that a Louisiana statutelI prohibiting arbitration
agreements controlled and reversely preempted the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 12 (New York
Convention) because the McCarran-Ferguson Act13 allowed reverse
preemption.14 The district court certified that its ruling involved a question of
law with substantially differing opinions and recommended immediate
appeal under the statute. 15 The Fifth Circuit granted the appeal and
concluded that the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not provide the Louisiana
statute the power to reverse preempt the New York Convention.16 The panel
opinion was vacated upon the granting of a rehearing en banc.17
7 Safety Nat'1 Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 587 F.3d 714,
717-18 (5th Cir. 2009).
8Id.
9 Id.
10 Id
11 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:868 (previously LA.REv.STAT. ANN. § 22:629).
12 Convention on the Recgonition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2157, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
13 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006).
14 Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 587 F.3d 714,
717-18 (5th Cir. 2009).
15 Id. at 718; see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2009) (stating that when a district judge
decides that their order involves a "controlling question of law as to which there is
substantial ground for different of opinion," the Court of Appeals of the circuit that
would ordinarily decide other interlocutory appeals has discretionary jurisdiction
regarding appeals from the district court's order).
16 Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp., 543 F.3d at 752.
17 Id. at 718.
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III. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S EN BANC HOLDING AND REASONING
The full bench of the Fifth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Priscilla
Owen, identified three issues in its opinion: (1) whether the New York
Convention was an "Act of Congress" because it fell within the language of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act; (2) whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act
applied to international commercial transactions; and (3) whether the New
York Convention superseded the McCarran-Ferguson Act even when the Act
applies to international transactions.18
A. Texts of the Treaties and Acts
The Court determined that the text of the statutes and treaties would
control the result, and their interaction would resolve the reverse preemption
issue19 and whether the Mccarran-Ferguson Act considered an international
treaty in its reverse preemption language. 20 Moreover, Supreme Court
precedent that analyzed the interaction of statutes and treaties and interpreted
their meaning always started with the text.21
1. The Louisiana Statute
The Louisiana statute at issue stated that:
A. No insurance contract delivered or issued for delivery in this
state... . shall contain any condition, stipulation, or agreement:
(1) Requiring it to be construed according to the laws of any other state
or country except as necessary to meet the requirements of the motor
vehicle financial responsibility laws of such other state or country; or
(2) Depriving the courts of this state of the jurisdiction of action against
the insurer
18 Id. The court never reached the latter two issues, ruling that after the McCarran-
Ferguson Act did not allow reverse preemption, the latter points were moot.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 718-19.
21 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356-58 (2008) (holding that
similar to the process of interpreting the text of a statute, the interpretation of a treaty
begins with its text).
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C. Any such condition, stipulation, or agreement in violation of this
Section shall be void, but such voiding shall not affect the validity of the
other provisions of the contract. 22
The Fifth Circuit noted it was not clear the statute prohibited and voided
arbitration agreements; however, previous Louisiana court decisions found
the statute acted to hold arbitration agreements unenforceable. 23 The
Louisiana statute, when interpreted to make arbitration agreements void and
unenforceable, conflicts with the New York Convention. 24
2. The International Convention
The New York Convention is an agreement adopted by diplomatic
conference and prepared by the United Nations on June 10, 1958.25 The New
York Convention requires that contracting nations enforce arbitration
agreements in actions covered under the Convention and recognize
arbitration awards from other states.26 The New York Convention states that
courts "shall" require arbitration when an international arbitration agreement
exists, subject to "certain agreements not at issue" in the case before the Fifth
Circuit.27
22 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:868 (section (b) contains a provision prohibiting
limitations on actions against insurers).
23 Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 587 F.3d 714,
719 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters of London, 120
F.3d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 1997); Doucet v. Dental Health Plans Mgmt. Corp., 412 So.2d
1383, 1384 (La. 1982). See accord W. Eng. Ship Owners Mut. Ins. Ass'n (Luxembourg)
v. Am. Marine Corp., 981 F.2d 749, 750 n.5 (5th Cir. 1993) ("Louisiana has prohibited
arbitration clauses in insurance policies") (citing LA.REv.STAT. ANN. § 22:868; Doucet,
412 So.2d at 1384).
24 Safety Nat'1 Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 719
25 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art.
11(1), June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
26 Id. at art. 11(3). The agreement requires that:
the court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect
of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article,
shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it
finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed.
Id.
27 Safety Nat'1 Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 719.
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The New York Convention is reinforced in the United States by the
Convention Act, which provides that the New York Convention will be
enforced in the United States, as proscribed by the Convention.28 The
Convention Act was passed by Congress and signed by the President on July
31, 1970.29 The Convention Act also establishes relevant definitions, federal
court jurisdiction, and venue.30 Judge Owen, writing for the majority, noted
that the disputing parties agreed that the New York Convention requires
arbitration in direct contravention with the Louisiana statute.31
3. The McCarren-Ferguson Act
The McCarran-Ferguson Act, the final actor in this statutory
interpretation ballet, passed March 9, 1945.32 The Act provides, among other
things, that:
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by
the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and
that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any
barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States. 33
The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides the basis for states to
reverse preempt federal laws. Understanding the basis for reverse
preemption first requires a necessary sidestep and explanation of
preemption doctrine.
B. Preemption and Reverse Preemption
1. Preemption Doctrine Generally
Preemption is not a new doctrine, and is the concept that a federal law
can unseat state laws, regulations, or administrative rules.34 Preemption
arises from the Constitution: the Supremacy Clause states that "the Laws of
28 See 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2006).
29 Id.
30 Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 587 F.3d 714,
719 (5th Cir. 2009).
31 Id.
32 15 U.S.C. § 1011- 15 (2006).
33 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2006).
34 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1297 (9th ed. 2009).
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the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land."35 Preemption occurs in two manners:
express or implied. Express preemption occurs when a federal statute directly
states Congress' intent to preempt state laws.36 Implied preemption arises
when a court infers federal intent to preempt state laws.37 Implied
preemption has two forms, but essentially happens when a pervasive, federal
regulation, dominant federal interest;38 or when state law stands as an
impossible "obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."39
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),40 although lacking an express
preemption clause,4 1 nevertheless expresses congressional intent to
"overcome courts' refusals to enforce agreements to arbitrate." 42 The
Supreme Court has regularly held the FAA applies to state courts,
preempting state statutes that invalidate arbitration agreements.43 In
Southland Corp. v. Keating, the Supreme Court held that the FAA preempted
35 U.S. CONsT. art. V1, cl. 2.
36 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990); see also ERISA § 514(a),
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994) (an example of express preemption). The ERISA statute
proscribes that "[ERISA] shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan. "Id. Note that Congress could override
the Federal Arbitration Act and decide that pre-dispute arbitration agreements are
unenforceable. See Drahozal, infra note 39, at 393 n.5.
37 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (holding that any state law that conflicts
with a federal law is preempted); see also Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505
U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (holding that conflict arises when state law creates an obstacle to
achieving Congress' objectives). For a review of the preemption doctrine, see generally
California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
38 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
39 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see also Christopher R. Drahozal,
Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 397 (2004) (noting that Hines is
traditionally considered as one of the standard cases for obstacle preemption, the case
itself involved field preemption).
40 9 U.S.C. § 1-16 (2006) (Chapter I of the FAA); 9 U.S.C. § 201-08, 301-07
(2006) (applying the FAA to international arbitration).
41 See Drahozal, supra note 39, at 397 n.29 (citing Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86
VA. L. REv. 225, 299 (2000)) (arguing that there is little difference between § 2 of the
FAA and an express preemption provision).
42 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995).
43 See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947 (1995);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985);
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
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a California anti-waiver provision when that provision was applied in an
attempt to void arbitration clauses.44 The California Supreme Court
previously ruled that a claim arising under the California Franchise
Investment Law-created to protect franchisees from unfair practices by
franchisors-was not subject to arbitration because the arbitration clause was
an invalid provision.45 The Supreme Court reversed the ruling, identifying a
broad national policy favoring arbitration and that the FAA preempted the
state statute.46 The Supreme Court concluded that "Congress intended to
foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of
arbitration agreements." 47
2. Reverse Preemption Doctrine
Reverse preemption is more difficult to define and far more rare. One
commentator, attempting to define reverse preemption, wrote that implied
reverse preemption occurs when courts can infer congressional retreat from
earlier instances of implied preemption.48 In a previous reverse preemption
case, the Fifth Circuit held that FAA ordinarily permits a party to compel
arbitration through the courts when the other parties ignore or neglect
arbitration agreements.49 Judge Stewart, writing for the majority, stated that
some federal laws create exceptions where state laws can control, and in the
specific instance before the Fifth Circuit, the federal law provided that "[n]o
Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any
law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance.... unless such Act specifically relates to the business of
insurance."50 Therefore, a state statute could reverse preempt federal laws if
the state statute was in the business of insurance, which included examining
whether "(1) the federal statute does not specifically relate to the 'business of
insurance;' (2) the state law was enacted for the 'purpose of regulating the
business of insurance;' and (3) the federal statute operates to 'invalidate,
4 Southland, 465 U.S. at 16.
45 Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1198, 1203-04 (Cal. 1982).
46 Southland, 465 U.S. at 10.
4 7 Id. at 16.
48 See Anita Bernstein, Implied Reverse Preemption, 74 BROOK. L. REv. 669, 673-
74 (2009).
49 Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida v. Inman, 436 F.3d 490, 493 (5th Cir. 2006)
(citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991)).
50 Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida v. Inman, 436 F.3d 490, 493 (5th Cir. 2006)
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b)).
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impair, or supercede [sic]' the state law." 51 The Court analyzed the state
statute, determined it regulated the business of insurance, related to the
business of insurance, and therefore the state statute reverse preempted the
FAA. 52
3. Reverse Preemption in Safety National
In Safety National, the Fifth Circuit's analysis would proceed similarly to
its previous reverse preemption cases, except that the New York Convention
confused the interpretation. The McCarran-Ferguson Act allows a state
statute to reverse preempt, if such statute "relates to the business of
insurance." 53 The McCarran-Ferguson Act only allowed Congress to
eliminate the possibility of reverse preemption through an explicit Act of
Congress. 54 The Fifth Circuit noted that neither the New York Convention,
nor the implementing Convention Act is specifically related to the business
of insurance;55 however, the Louisiana statute, regulating reinsurance
agreements between insurers, operated within the meaning of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act. 56 Therefore, as Judge Owen noted, if the New York
Convention is a self-executing treaty, it was not an Act of Congress.57
However, if the New York Convention required congressional action to
validate, then the Convention would not be self-executing (a "non-self-
executing" treaty) and would be an Act of Congress as within the McCarran-
Ferguson Act.5 8
Determining whether the New York Convention was self-executing, the
Fifth Circuit looked to the Supreme Court's decision in Medellin v. Texas,
where the Court examined the "Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
and the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of
51 Am. Bankers, 436 F.3d at 493 (citing Munich Am. Reinsurance Co. v. Crawford,
141 F.3d 585, 590 (5th Cir. 1998)).
52 Id at 493-94 (citing Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129
(1982).
53 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
54 Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 587 F.3d 714,
721 (5th Cir. 2009).
55 Safety Nat'1 Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 720.
56 Id
57 Id
58 Id
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Disputes to the Vienna Convention."59 In Medellin, the Court noted that
disputes arising out of the Vienna Convention and the Optional Protocol
"shall" be under the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and
"may" accordingly be brought to the International Court of Justice. 60 The
Supreme Court decided that treaties have different binding effect than
domestic law and do not alone function as binding federal law.61 The Court
held that a treaty was self-executing when it is equivalent to an act of the
legislature and operates without the aid of the legislature. 62 Conversely, a
treaty was not self-executing when the treaty stipulations required legislative
action before it could be enforced in the United States. 63 In summary, the
Supreme Court decided that treaties are international commitments, but the
provisions of the treaty do not become domestic law unless Congress either
enacts statutes enforcing the treaty or the international commitment itself is
self-executing and ratified as self-executing.64
Considering the Supreme Court's guidance in Medellin, the Fifth Circuit
noted that the New York Convention expressly required domestic courts to
enforce arbitration awards as per an international arbitration agreement,
using mandatory "shall" language.65 However, Judge Owen also noted that
Medellin dicta explicitly stated New York Convention provisions regarding
enforcing international arbitration tribunal judgments were not self-
executing. 66 However, Judge Owen reasoned that a "treaty remains an
international agreement or contract negotiated by the Executive Branch and
ratified by the Senate, not by Congress."67 The Fifth Circuit stated that
59 Id. at 721 (citing Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008); see also Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, Dec. 24, 1969, 21
U.S.T. 77 (Vienna Conventions); 21 U.S.T. 325 (Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77; Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory
Settlement of Disputes, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325)
60 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 499.
61 Id. at 503-04.
62 Id. at 504-05 (citing United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833)) (holding that
a treaty is "equivalent to an act of the legislature" when such treaty "operates of itself
without the aid of any legislative provision.").
63 Id. (citing Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888)) ("stipulations are not self-
executing [when] they can only be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them into
effect.").
6 Id. at 505 (citing Igartua-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir.
2005) (en banc).
65 Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 587 F.3d 714,
722 (5th Cir. 2009).
66 Id. (citing Medellin, 552 U.S. at 504).
67 Safety Nat'1 Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 723.
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because a treaty is implemented by Congress, implementation does not
change the treaty into an Act of Congress.68
The Fifth Circuit held that Congress would not differentiate between
self-executing treaty provisions and treaty provisions implemented through
legislative action when it passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act and allowed
reverse preemption through an "Act of Congress" in the McCarran-Ferguson
Act.69 Judge Owen found support for this conclusion in the terms of the New
York Convention Act and the 1970 Amendments to the FAA, which
provided that "action[s] or proceeding[s] falling under the Convention "shall
be deemed to arise under the laws and treaties of the United States." 70 The
Fifth Circuit concluded that Congress recognized that privileges from the
Convention were not provided merely through Acts of Congress in the action
of implementing the New York Convention. 71
Further, the Convention Act stated that the New York Convention "shall
be enforced in United States courts in accordance with this chapter."72 The
Convention Act passed by Congress, in implementing the New York
Convention, explicitly states that the New York Convention is the operative
legal agreement. 73 Examination of the New York Convention confirms that
the Convention encompasses the operative legal language. 74 The Convention
provides courts with jurisdiction; the Convention defines whether agreements
fall under its contents; and therefore, when the Convention conflicts with the
FAA, the Convention applies, not the Convention Act.75 According to the
Fifth Circuit, the New York Convention controls and supersedes the
Louisiana statute because the Convention is an implemented treaty.76
McCarran-Ferguson's "no Act of Congress" language allowing reverse
preemption does not appear to arise when the operative agreement is a
treaty.77 The Fifth Circuit also noted that the Supreme Court used similar
6 8 Id. at 723.
69 Id. at 724.
70 Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 203).
71 Safety Nat'1 Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 587 F.3d 714,
724 (5th Cir. 2009).
7 2 Id. at 724.
73 Id.
74 9 U.S.C. § 201-203
75 Safety Nat'l Cas Corp., 587 F.3d at 724-25.
76 Id.
77 Safety Nat'1 Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 587 F.3d 714,
725 (5th Cir. 2009). Judge Owen, writing for the majority, also countered the dissent's
claim that consensus existed regarding implemented non-self-executing treaties, in that
legal scholars and other courts disagree with the majority's holding. Id. at 726. The
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language to conclude. that non-self-executing treaties can be considered
federal law.78
4. Determining Whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act Included
Treaties
The majority noted that in previous cases, the Supreme Court analyzed
treaties as treaties and not as Acts of Congress, even when implementing
legislation existed. 79 In Holland, the Supreme Court deliberated about a non-
self-executing treaty protecting migratory birds, where Congress passed
implementing legislation, giving the treaty effect in the United States.80
When the State of Missouri tried to stop enforcing the act and regulations
created in support of the treaty, the Supreme Court held that there was a
difference between Congress acting through the Commerce Clause and a
treaty followed by an implementing act.81 But for the treaty, the State of
Missouri would otherwise be free to regulate migratory birds within state
boundaries; however, Congress implemented the treaty under the Necessary
and Proper clause, declaring the treaty supreme law of the land under the
authority of the Constitution. 82 When Congress possessed the proper power
to implement the treaty under the Constitution, the Supreme Court thereafter
upheld the treaty and implementing act, superseding any Missouri laws. 83
Reasoning from Supreme Court precedent, the Fifth Circuit held that the
McCarran-Ferguson Act was not intended to abrogate treaties implemented
by an Act of Congress when the treaties conflicted with state laws regarding
majority, however, noted that the consensus of legal scholars existed in a comment to the
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, written by an
individual who advocated for enforcing implemented treaty provisions. Id. at 726 (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 11
cmt. h (1987)). The court cited by the dissent as disagreeing with the Fifth Circuit was the
Ninth Circuit, stating that an implementing treaty should be given its plain meaning even
if the interpretation conflicted with the treaty it implements. Safety Nat '1 Cas Corp., 587
F. 3d at 726 (citing Hopson v. Kreps, 622 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1980).
78 See Medellin, 552 U.S. 491, 504-05 (2008).
79 Safety Nat'1 Cas Corp., 587 F.3d at 727-28 (citing Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S.
416 (1920)).
80 1d. (citing Holland, 252 U.S. at 431).
81 Id. (citing Holland, 252 U.S. at 433).
82 Id. (citing Holland, 252 U.S. at 433-35).
83 Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 587 F.3d 714,
727-28 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Holland, 252 U.S. at 435).
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the business of insurance. 84 Additionally, the McCarran-Ferguson Act was
passed after the Supreme Court's decision in Holland and therefore, the Fifth
Circuit opined that Congress would be reasonably aware that a treaty and its
implementing acts could serve as a source of authority to override state
powers.85 Therefore, if Congress had wanted to include treaties as
congressional actions that could be reverse preempted, the Fifth Circuit
reasoned that the McCarran-Ferguson Act would have included such treaties
in its language. 86
IV. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S RULING
A. Arbitration Policy Considerations
The Fifth Circuit noted that its decision supporting arbitration of the
dispute between Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, the LSAT, and Safety
National Casualty Corporation was in line with the general federal policy
supporting arbitration. 87 Citing Supreme Court precedent, Judge Owen held
that compelling arbitration among the three disputing parties encouraged the
rising tide of arbitration in international commercial transactions, when
supported by an agreement to arbitrate.88 Previous decisions clearly indicated
that the FAA was a plain declaration of congressional intent that courts
should liberally construe the scope of arbitration agreements. 89 Therefore,
Congress must clearly indicate its intent to not include a type of agreement in
order for courts to ignore the standard preference for arbitration. 90 For
example, in Mitsubishi, the Supreme Court looked at antitrust laws-text and
legislative history-to determine whether there was any congressional intent
to exclude agreements that waived the right to a judicial forum.91 Following
the lead of the Supreme Court, Judge Owen did not see any discernable
intent to retreat from favoring arbitration in the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
84 Id. at 729.
85 Id.
8 6 Id.
8 Id. at 730.
88 Id. (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 616, 626-27, 638-39 (1985)).
89 Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 587 F.3d 714,
730 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627).
90 Id.
91 Id. (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628).
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even though the act provides for strong state control in the business of
insurance.92 Quoting the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi, the Fifth Circuit said:
'[h]aving permitted the arbitration to go forward, the national
courts . . . will have the opportunity at the award-enforcement stage to
ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of the antitrust laws
has been addressed.' The same is true of substantive Louisiana law that
applies to the reinsurance agreements presently at issue. 93
B. Conflict with the Second Circuit
The Fifth Circuit noted that its decision conflicted with the Second
Circuit, which found that the New York Convention was not self-
executing. 94 The Second Circuit held that the language implementing the
Convention did not preempt a Kentucky statute subordinating arbitration
provisions.95 The Second Circuit stated that treaties address political
functions, not legislative actions, and Congress could only make the contract
a rule by executing it in a law.96 The Second Circuit reasoned that the terms
of the New York Convention were not binding and the language of the
Convention Act that implemented the Convention did not explicitly make the
provisions law.97 Therefore, implementing legislation did not preempt a
Kentucky statute.98
The Fifth Circuit agreed that when the provisions of a treaty are not self-
executing, they are not enforceable in court unless implemented in
Congress.99 However, the Fifth Circuit noted that this argument did not
answer the language of the McCarran-Ferguson Act-in that using the
language regarding "[n]o Act of Congress" would then only address treaties
that only require implementation by Congress.100 The Fifth Circuit then
noted that in giving the commonly understood meanings to congressional
92 Id.
93 Id. at 730-731 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638).
94 Id. (citing Stephens v. Am. Int'l. Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41 (2nd Cir. 1995).
9 Stephens, 66 F.3d at 45.
96 Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 587 F.3d 714,
731 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Stephens, 66 F.3d at 43, 45).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. (citing Stephens, 66 F.3d at 43, 45).
100 Id.
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language, there was no clear indication that Congress wanted to "distinguish
between self-executing and non-self-executing-but-implemented treaties."101
The Fifth Circuit also noted that the Second Circuit's reasoning was at
odds with subsequent decisions. 102 In the National Distillers & Chemical
Corp. decision, the Second Circuit held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act did
not allow reverse preemption "whenever federal law clearly intends to
displace all state laws to the contrary."l 03 The Second Circuit reasoned that
federal laws applied to the insurance industry despite the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, when a federal law like the FAA clearly intends to displace
contradictory state laws.104 In fact, ruling against the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, the Second Circuit stated that the Act does not force reverse preemption
when the FAA clearly intends to preempt all other state laws-the
McCarran-Ferguson Act does not "win" merely because a state statute relates
to the business of insurance.105
V. CONCLUSION
The decision of the Fifth Circuit allowing arbitration between these
international parties in an international contract affirms not only the federal
presumption and affinity for arbitration, but also serves to enforce
international agreements to arbitrate. Given that the Fifth Circuit would allow
reverse FAA preemption when explicitly provided -for, but only when
explicitly provided for, the Fifth Circuit relatively narrowed the ability of
state statutes to reverse preempt the FAA. Therefore, the range of agreements
that can be put into arbitration are expanded as per the usual practice of
courts in dealing with FAA preemption. Finally, as the circuits are split and
disagree, this issue of treaties and their effect on the preemption process will
likely be heard by the Supreme Court in the near future.
KEvIN D. OLES
101 Id
102 Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 587 F.3d
714, 731 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Stephens v. Nat'l Distillers & Chem Corp., 69 F.3d 1226
(2nd Cir. 1995)).
103 Id. at 731-32 (citing Stephens, 69 F.3d 1226 (2nd Cir. 1995)).
104 Stephens, 69 F.3d at 1233.
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